

# **BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: A METL ADJUSTMENT FOR INFANTRY BATTALIONS**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
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## ABSTRACT

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This paper analyzes how a unit's METL can assist infantry battalions in preparing for and executing peacekeeping operations as well as their wartime mission. Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* states, "Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit's mission essential task list (METL)." With the United States currently involved in four different peace operations, restricting peace operations tasks from a unit's METL risks deploying untrained soldiers on critical missions.

This study begins by examining United States policy and military doctrine concerning peace operations. Once this foundation is established, the author then reviews the Army's current training doctrine to provide the basis for analyzing the monograph's case studies. Three battalions preparing for and executing peacekeeping operations in the Sinai and Macedonia since 1993 are analyzed. The analysis focuses on the versatility of each battalion and how their METL influenced the preparation for and executing of each peacekeeping mission.

The study concludes that the Army's current battle focused training methodology is an excellent means for units to identify their mission essential tasks. However, the overemphasis in training doctrine to limit a unit's METL to tasks associated only to a conceptual "wartime mission" is not reflective of the tasks required for peacekeeping operations. The war that many units find themselves fighting in the 1990s, more often than not, is operations other than war such as peacekeeping. This study then recommends that peacekeeping tasks should not be restricted from an infantry battalion's METL.


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
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
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The prime focus of the Army is warfighting, yet the Army's frequent role in operations other than war is critical.

Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, 1993

## I. INTRODUCTION

The world's security environment continues to evolve following the end of the Cold War. Since Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. military has become increasingly involved in operations other than war. For example, within the last five years the U.S. military's participation in peace operations includes operations in Somalia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Haiti, the Sinai, and northern and southern Iraq.<sup>1</sup> The size, scope, and frequency of peace operations in the 1990s are unprecedented in the American military experience.

The 1993 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*, recognizes the changing world security environment and incorporates the concept of operations other than war (OOTW) into Army doctrine. Field Manual 100-5 states, "The Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nation's wars. However, Army forces and soldiers operate around the world in an environment that may not involve combat."<sup>2</sup> This keystone manual describes the principles and tenets of OOTW and provides a doctrinal framework for Army forces engaged in shaping the new world order.

The increased pace and complexity of peace operations during military reductions stirred a national policy debate regarding United States involvement in multilateral peace operations. Concerns in both military and political circles ranged from the roles and missions of the armed forces to the effects that peace operations would have on combat

readiness. Numerous studies, reports, and congressional hearings were conducted in an effort to provide answers to the above concerns.

As the policy debate continues, so does the military's involvement in peace operations. The December 1996 extension of American's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, highlights this point.<sup>3</sup> Army leaders, charged with the responsibility of training soldiers and units for war, must also ensure units are trained for peace operations. Strategies and opinions differ significantly, however, on how to meet this training challenge.<sup>4</sup> The policy debate concerning the United States' role in multilateral peace operations and the effects that peace operations have on strategic readiness is beyond the scope of this monograph. It is mentioned, however, that these debates influence individual positions concerning the type, frequency, and amount of peace operations training required for soldiers and units.<sup>5</sup>

### **Problem Background And Significance**

The focus of this study is on the challenge of preparing infantry battalions for peacekeeping operations. Though the mission essential task list (METL) serves as the focal point for planning, executing and assessing unit training, Army training and peace operations doctrine suggests excluding peacekeeping tasks from a unit's METL. Specifically, the Army's principal peace operations doctrine, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* states,

Training and preparation for peace operations should not detract from a unit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat. *The first and foremost requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of warfighting skills.* Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit's mission essential task list (METL).<sup>6</sup>

Infantry battalions designated for peacekeeping operations must develop a training strategy to prepare for upcoming operations. Since the METL is the key document that drives the infantry battalion's training focus and readiness assessment, the risk associated with excluding peacekeeping specific tasks from their METL includes deploying untrained soldiers on a critical mission. The question this monograph seeks to answer is: Should infantry battalions change their METL when preparing for and or executing peacekeeping operations?

### **Methodology**

This study consists of seven chapters. Following the introduction, this monograph provides a background of United States policy and military doctrine concerning peace operations and examines the peacekeeping environment. This chapter establishes that peacekeeping operations are part of the current administration's strategy to manage conflict. Additionally, this chapter shows how infantry battalions can expect to continue to participate in peacekeeping operations in the future. Next, this monograph reviews the Army's battle focus training methodology to provide the foundation for analyzing the three case studies in this monograph. This chapter also introduces the idea that peacekeeping operations require additional training and skills for individuals, staffs, and units above and beyond those skills trained to for high-intensity combat.

Three case studies of U.S. infantry battalions participating in multinational peacekeeping operations follow. The intent is to provide a sample of how selected infantry battalions, following Operation Desert Storm and the publication of the new FM

100-5, prepared for and executed recent peacekeeping missions. The first case study surveys Task Force 3-187 Infantry during their preparation for and execution of peacekeeping with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai. The second and third case studies examine two task forces during their preparation and training for Operation Able Sentry in Macedonia. Task Force 6-502 Infantry, the first U.S. unit to deploy to Macedonia, provides unique insight to the preparation and training for peacekeeping operations. Task Force 3-12 Infantry, the fourth unit to rotate to Macedonia, represents follow-on units preparing for and executing Operation Able Sentry after the mission stabilized. Both the MFO mission and Operation Able Sentry provides a fair representation of how some infantry battalions prepared, trained for, and executed peacekeeping operations since 1993.<sup>7</sup>

The analysis section begins by examining the logic behind the school of thought that suggests excluding peacekeeping specific tasks from a unit's METL. Next, this chapter assesses each battalion case study to help provide an answer to the primary research question. The criteria used for analysis is twofold. First, each battalion's predeployment METL development process is assessed against the doctrine established in FM 25-100 concerning METL development. The second criteria used for analysis is the versatility of each infantry battalion and its ability to adapt from a combat mission focus to peacekeeping operations. Emphasis is on how the battalion's METL either added or detracted from this process. The study concludes that there is a significant advantage in adding peacekeeping tasks to an infantry battalion's METL when preparing for and executing peacekeeping operations.

Multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy. Peace operations often have served, and continue to serve, important U.S. national interests.

*A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*

## II. UNITED STATES PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT

According to Field Manual 100-23, peace operations encompass three types of activities including support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. For consistency, this monograph recognizes the definition of peacekeeping, a component of peace operations, as defined in FM 100-23.

Peacekeeping involves military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. The operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peacekeeping activities include observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires and supervision of truces.<sup>8</sup>

Peace operations are not new to the United States and will remain a part of U.S. national strategy for some time to come. American forces have served in several peace operations since 1948, to include the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in the Middle East, Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), and the Sinai (since 1982).<sup>9</sup> The 1995 *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (NSS), *Presidential Decision Directive 25* "United States Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," and the *National Military Strategy* (NMS) provide the basis for current U.S. strategy concerning peace operations. The NSS states, "From traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement, multinational peace operations are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more

costly.”<sup>10</sup> While the Clinton administration’s security strategy recognizes the value of peace operations, it also recognizes that America simply cannot afford to participate in every peace operation required around the world. The costs, both financially and to military readiness, require careful screening before the U.S. commits to each multilateral peace operation. *Presidential Decision Directive 25* lists in detail the criteria established for committing U.S. troops or providing support to multilateral peace operations.

The United States Congress continues to debate American involvement in multilateral peace operations leading to several bills that may limit U.S. involvement in multinational peace operations.<sup>11</sup> Internal budget constraints, military downsizing, and a general disillusionment with United Nations’ operations in Somalia and Bosnia are just a few areas influencing recent Congressional legislation.<sup>12</sup> While the scope of this monograph does not permit a detailed discussion of U.S. foreign policy and relationships with the UN, it is important to note that U.S. policy toward peace operations is dynamic. It is safe to say, however, that peace operations will continue to be a part of U.S. national strategy.

### **Military Peace Operations Doctrine**

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, provides the foundation for how U.S. forces will fight and operate as a joint team in war and operations other than war. In war, the military conducts large scale combat operations with the goal to win quickly and with as few casualties as possible. In OOTW, military forces focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, and promoting peace. Note in figure 1 that OOTW

encompasses a vast range of operations that may or may not involve combat. Peacekeeping falls on the line between combat and non-combat operations.<sup>13</sup>




Fig. 1. Range of military operations.

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War*, points out that political considerations permeate all levels during OOTW and that the military may not be the primary player.<sup>14</sup> As a result, these operations normally require more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than war. Both Joint and Army doctrine recognize that the OOTW environment is unique and offer six applicable principles for consideration. The principles of OOTW are: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. For example, perseverance applied to peacekeeping, requires tactical commanders to maintain a long term focus on strategic objectives when making tactical decision during the operation. Additionally when considering the principle of restraint and legitimacy, peacekeeping demands that the peacekeeping force maintains strict neutrality in a potentially hostile environment.<sup>15</sup>



This concept is not easy for soldiers and leaders to grasp who are traditionally trained in the flexible application of combat power to win decisive engagements.<sup>16</sup>

While the history of U.S. Army involvement in peace operations dates back before the American Civil War, a comprehensive doctrine for peace operations is only now emerging. Not until the 1990 publication of FM 100-20, *Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict* and the 1992 publication of FM 7-98, *Operations In A Low-Intensity Conflict* did army manuals address peace operations in detail. In 1994, shortly after publishing FM 100-5, the Army published FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, part of an effort to provide commanders at all levels the doctrine necessary to prepare units for peace operations. During the same year, the Army acted as the executive agent for writing Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Peacekeeping Operations*. The timely arrival of both manuals assisted U.S. Forces in planning for and eventually executing peace operations in the Balkans.

Field Manual 100-23 provides guidance for the planning, training, and support of peace operations and addresses the different peace environments in detail. Drawing from historical lessons learned, this manual provides both the principles and fundamentals of peace operations. One of the key operational variables listed in FM 100-23 is the use of force. Since peace operations, especially peace enforcement, are often volatile by nature, it is tempting to employ force. Figure 2 shows, however, that successful peacekeeping operations minimize the use of force. This brings up an interesting dichotomy between peacekeeping and combat operations, and the associated training to prepare for both.<sup>17</sup>

OPERATIONAL VARIABLES			
Variables	Support to Diplomacy	Peacekeeping	Peace Enforcement
<i>Consent</i>	High	High	Low
<i>Force</i>	Low	Low self-defense/defense of mandate from interference	Sufficient to compel/ coerce
<i>Impartiality</i>	High	High	Low

Fig. 2. The operational variables in peace operations.

### The Peacekeeping Environment

What is so dramatically different in peacekeeping operations that might cause an infantry battalion to change its METL? This question should be one of the first answered when developing the training strategy to ready a unit for peacekeeping. Infantry battalions, traditionally organized, equipped and trained for combat operations, could require an adjustment to their METL when preparing for and conducting peacekeeping operations. This section highlights the unique characteristics of peacekeeping.

The peacekeeping mission itself is one of the major differences from the mission normally given infantry battalions in combat. Mission tasks such as monitor, observe, and report, replace tasks such as destroy, capture, or defeat—tasks common for infantry battalions in combat operations. The idea of applying overwhelming force at the decisive point on the battlefield may not apply in peacekeeping operations. In peacekeeping, the nature of intervention is often unrehearsed and spontaneous. Negotiation, mediation, and

arbitration, normally diplomatic activities, are the soldier's weapons in a peacekeeping environment. Soldiers and units trained for combat need additional training to operate successfully in the peacekeeping environment.<sup>18</sup>

Additionally, when considering the use of force, one must consider who is the *enemy*. The ancient Chinese sage Sun Tzu said, "One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements."<sup>19</sup> When thinking about the enemy in a peacekeeping environment, a different mindset is helpful. In peacekeeping, the enemy is often not an army or a faction—the enemy is *conflict* itself. This unorthodox approach may give commanders new insight when developing their concept of operations. Possible enemy (conflict) center(s) of gravity may be hatred, distrust, or misunderstanding between belligerents, that when identified, may assist the commander in developing his plan to manage conflict.<sup>20</sup> The commander, however, must always consider and protect against any possible threat (belligerent parties, terrorist) that may endanger the peacekeeping force or the mission.

The organization of an infantry battalion task force for peacekeeping may also be quite different from a battalion organized for combat operations. The organization, training readiness, and equipment of the peacekeeping task force must be a consideration when deciding whether to adjust the battalion's METL. Looking at an infantry battalion's METL from another perspective, one might ask if the battalion, reorganized into a peacekeeping task force, could successfully conduct many of its METL tasks.

Units best suited for peacekeeping operations are infantry forces with augmentation. Military police, special forces, and logistics personnel provide critical functions to

to the peacekeeping task force. Examining the operational mandate and conducting detailed mission analysis helps determine the appropriate force structure for the peacekeeping mission. Mandated personnel, weapons, and equipment restrictions require careful consideration by commanders when forming the peacekeeping task force. Regularly, only small arms and light mortars accompany the peacekeeping force. When organizing the peacekeeping task force, however, the force should be large enough to: “defend itself and establish a visible presence; flexible and mobile enough to concentrate forces in response to a local threat; and organized to facilitate the logistic support needed to preserve its effectiveness.”<sup>21</sup>

Once task organized and deployed to a peacekeeping operation, the capabilities of the infantry battalion change significantly. Leaving an anti-armor company behind or not deploying the battalion’s primary weapon systems changes unit capabilities. A mechanized battalion without its Bradley Fighting Vehicles for example, would have difficulty executing the battalion collective task *movement to contract* to the standards set in their mission training plan.

The *Peacekeeper’s Handbook* states, “Peacekeeping calls for an adjustment of attitude and approach by the soldier to a different set of circumstances from those he would normally find on the battlefield; and adjustment to suit the need of a peaceful intervention rather than that of an enforcement action.”<sup>22</sup> By examining U.S. peace operations strategy, military peacekeeping doctrine, and the peacekeeping environment, this chapter lays the foundations for answering the question if an infantry battalion should change their METL once assigned to a peacekeeping operation.

### III. BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPERS

According to an Army Research Institute report, “The assumption that a combat-ready unit is equally ready for traditional or contingency missions may be overly optimistic—a unit’s METL in peace operations may be considerably different from its wartime METL.”<sup>23</sup> While FM 100-23 recognizes the unique training requirements required to successfully execute peacekeeping operations, it also suggests excluding peacekeeping tasks from a unit’s METL. The METL is the key document that guides the unit’s training plan. To exclude mission essential tasks from an infantry battalion’s METL may risk deploying untrained soldiers on a critical mission. Field Manual 100-23’s “*just enough*” and “*just in time*” training philosophy is somewhat disconcerting.<sup>24</sup> This chapter will review the Army’s battle focused training methodology to provide the basis for analyzing the monograph’s three case studies.

Two manuals, FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, provide the foundation for the Army’s current training management system. Published in 1988, *Training the Force* established a new doctrinal base for the Army’s training system followed by *Battle Focused Training* that applied this doctrine in a how to format at the battalion level. Written when the Army’s warfighting strategy focused on forward presence and mid to high intensity combat, these manuals emphasized the importance of battle focused training for war. These manuals neglect, however, the ever increasing operations other than war in which army units find themselves executing in the 1990s.




Fig. 3.<sup>25</sup>

Battle focus is the central idea that permeates the Army's training management system. Figure 3 represents the METL development process as described in FM 25-101. To determine training priorities, commanders down to company level develop a METL. Below is a summary of the key points of METL and the METL development process described in FM 25-101.

Battle focus is a concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. Units cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on every possible soldier, leader, and collective tasks [task]. Commanders must selectively identify and train on those tasks that accomplish the unit's wartime mission. The METL serves as the focal point on which commanders plan, execute, and assess training... If a commander determines his unit cannot execute all the tasks on the unit's METL to standard, he must request an adjustment of the unit's mission. The commander determines which tasks he can train and execute.<sup>26</sup>

One of the major arguments for excluding peace operations tasks from a unit's METL is that peacekeeping operations require little or no specialized training. The argument goes that units trained for high intensity conflict, from nuclear war to heavy

tank battles, can surely execute peacekeeping operations without difficulty. Hence, a unit's METL should derive only from the unit's wartime mission focused on combat operations. As early as 1994, however, a Department of Defense Inspector General's report found that "Army and Marine Corps leaders have begun to recognize that peace operations pose a different set of challenges than those schooled, trained, and exercised only in warfighting."<sup>27</sup>

The writings of FMs 25-100 and 25-101 both pre-date the Army's latest warfighting doctrine of FM 100-5 and the current national security strategy. Changes in the threat, Army structure, and the world's security environment call for a more flexible application of Army training doctrine—specifically METL development. The METL development process is an excellent means of identifying the collective tasks required to train infantry battalions for war as well as operations other than war. By limiting a unit's METL to collective tasks associated only to its wartime mission, one overlooks the collective tasks required for operations other than war such as peacekeeping.<sup>28</sup>

The next two chapters examine how three separate infantry battalions prepared for an executed peacekeeping operations since 1993. All three battalions had wartime missions focused on combat operations. When tasks for their respective peacekeeping mission, each battalion had to adjust both their organization and training strategies to prepare for and execute their mission. Interestingly, these case studies show how each battalion took a different approach in using their METL to assist in preparing for their peacekeeping operation.

#### IV: MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN THE SINAI

The Protocol to the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel authorizes the establishment of the Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO). The MFO, operational by 1982, is an alternative to UN Forces and Observers called for in the Treaty of Peace. The mission of the MFO is “to supervise the implementation of Annex I of the Treaty of Peace and employ its best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.”<sup>29</sup> This chapter examines TF 3-187, a light infantry battalion task force, preparing for and executing peacekeeping operations with the MFO.

Tasked for the MFO mission in January 1995, the 3-187 Infantry reorganized to form Task Force (TF) 3-187 in March, and conducted peacekeeping operations in the Sinai from July 1995 to January 1996.<sup>30</sup> The battalion’s predeployment organization consisted of three line infantry companies, one anti-armor company, and a headquarters and headquarters company. The authorized personnel strength of the battalion upon mission notification was 670 soldiers, with the line infantry companies at 132 soldiers. Major weapon systems of the battalion included twenty TOWs, eighteen Dragons, and ten light mortars.<sup>31</sup>

The wartime mission of the battalion before reorganization was, “Deploy within 18 hours worldwide as part of a joint, combined, or unilateral task force and destroy enemy forces or seize and retain terrain to control land, people, and resources.”<sup>32</sup> The battalion’s METL, depicted on the following page, supported the battalion’s wartime mission.






Fig. 4.

Immediately following notification for the MFO mission, the staff began gathering information and conducted a mission analysis. The recommended organization of the MFO task force by the XVIII Airborne Corps was four line companies and a Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). The number of personnel of the U.S. task force is restricted to 529 and the MFO restricts TOW weapon systems from deploying. One of the primary concerns during the organization of TF 3-187 was whether to deploy the battalion's anti-armor company. Previous battalions of the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division tasked with the MFO mission, left their anti-armor (D Company) behind to serve as the rear detachment and to maintain its anti-armor specific skills. The 3-187 Infantry decided to deploy their reorganized anti-armor company as a 68 soldier line company. Other concerns with task organization involved the personnel turbulence within in the battalion. The battalion reassigned a number of soldiers who did not meet

deployment criteria, while approximately 200 new soldiers were integrated into the Task Force.<sup>33</sup>




Fig. 5. Task Organization of TF 3-187.<sup>34</sup>

The restated mission for the battalion was "Task Force 3-187 observes in Zone C, from 16 Jul 95 until relieved on or about 15 Jan 96, from checkpoints and observation points controlled by SCC5 and SCC7 [Sector Control Centers] in order to report and verify the implementation of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty."<sup>35</sup> The major specified and implied tasks identified for the mission also assisted in concept of the operations development and the identification of predeployment training requirements.

By March 1995, the battalion published a MFO predeployment letter covering task organization, a task force METL, and instructions to prepare TF 3-187 for the Sinai rotation. In Annex B of the predeployment letter, the battalion listed the METL for the task force and identified the battle staff and collective tasks required to execute the mission. From the Task Force METL, individual, leader, common and special skill

training were developed in a textbook example of how a METL assists in focusing the units training for the mission. The METL for Task Force 3-187 Infantry is depicted below.<sup>36</sup>




Fig. 6

The concept of the operation developed called for the Task Force headquarters to command the force from South Camp. While four line companies would deploy, only two of the four companies would occupy the Task Force's sector at any given time. The other two companies would remain in South Camp to perform base camp functions, train, rotate on quick reaction force duty, rest and refit. Companies A and C would rotate with each other every twenty-one days in the Task Force's northern sector. Companies B and D would rotate in the south. Companies in sector, would control their units from sector control centers (SCC) with their respective platoons and squads conducting operations from check points (CP) and observation posts (OP). Figure 7 on the following page depicts the concept of the operation for TF 3-187.<sup>37</sup>




Fig. 7.

The Task Force's activation ceremony marked the beginning of three months of predeployment training and preparation for the mission. TF 3-187 predeployment training consisted of five phases that focused on the Task Force's METL. Phase 1 incorporated the formal activation ceremony of the Task Force and mission and area orientation classes. Phase 2 (leader training), consisted of a one-week computer simulation exercise replicating the organization's command and control. This exercise placed units in situations likely encountered during the operation with the training audience of squad leaders and above. Phases 3, 4, and 5 were squad leader training, a battalion field training exercise, and squad validation and company sustainment training respectively. The battalion field training exercise replicated all remote sites in the Sinai and allowed the entire battalion to practice the collective and individual tasks required

for mission execution. Following the battalion exercise, the squads continued training on company internal validation sites. The validation required squads to operate under conditions similar to the Sinai, observing, reporting, and interacting with local nationals.<sup>38</sup>

According to the Task Force's after action report, the battalion's phased training and validation plan effectively prepared the unit for the mission. Task Force 3-187 trained rigorously and efficiently for this mission and the soldiers were trained and ready to execute upon arrival. The chain of command was well informed and prepared to face unique leadership challenges in the Sinai.<sup>39</sup> The Task Force commander indicates that the mission was a success and stated the mission was straightforward at the OP level with observation and reporting accuracy being critical to proper mission execution. The concept of operations developed during predeployment worked well with the four line company organization and was the recommend course of action for follow on units.<sup>40</sup>

In-country training consisted of final validation by the MFO, individual sustainment training (marksmanship and expert infantry badge training), and some squad and platoon collective training. Most of the platoons conducted live fire exercises and squad battle drills during the rotation, which sustained some conventional infantry skills. Major events during the operation included seven incidents (possible treaty violations) reported by the Task Force with five being investigated and reported to higher MFO authorities. The Task Force also assisted in a mass casualty operation involving a bus accident with over 50 severe and fatally injured Nigerian tourists.<sup>41</sup>

Task Force 3-504, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, relieved Task Force 3-187 in the Sinai in January 1996. Task Force 3-187 redeployed to Ft. Campbell and dissolved on 1 February 1996.<sup>42</sup> The 3-187 Infantry began a six month training and reorganization process to bring the battalion back to a combat ready air assault battalion. The battalion's METL, identical to the METL before forming the MFO task force, was the focus of training. The assessment of the battalion's METL proficiency at the start of the battalion's new training cycle was untrained on all METL tasks.<sup>43</sup>

This case study shows how an infantry battalion, organized and trained for combat, successfully adapted to perform a peacekeeping operations. The 3-187 Infantry's deliberate approach in reorganizing their battalion, changing their METL, and developing a predeployment training plan tailored for peacekeeping, proved successful in preparing the battalion for the MFO mission. This case study also demonstrates that peacekeeping operations have a cost to unit combat readiness. The task organization changes, limited training opportunities during the mission, and the high personnel turnover over after the MFO mission, all affected the combat readiness of 3-187.

## V: OPERATION ABLE SENTRY

United Nations Security Resolution 795 authorized the deployment of UN Forces to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in December 1992. A first in UN history, this operation deployed a peacekeeping force to a potentially volatile area before the outbreak of hostilities. In July of 1993, TF 6-502, Berlin Brigade, deployed to FYROM to join the United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) FYROM Command. This mission was and still is, to monitor and report activities along the Macedonia-Serbia border in what the Americans call Operation Able Sentry.<sup>44</sup>

Since TF 6-502's initial deployment, five additional American units have deployed to Macedonia on a six month rotations. By the end of the second Able Sentry rotation, the U.S. force in Macedonia expanded from a one company, to a two company battalion task force.<sup>45</sup> In March 1995, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) replaced UNPROFOR FYROM Command. The mission and organization of UNPREDEP, however, remained virtually the same as it did under UNPROFOR.<sup>46</sup> This chapter surveys two battalions (TF 6-502 and TF 3-12) during their preparation for and execution of Operation Able Sentry.

### **Task Force 5-602 Infantry**

The Berlin Brigade began contingency planning for deploying a reinforced company to join the UN peacekeeping mission in Macedonia in April 1993. On 11 June 1993, the Commander in Chief, USAREUR received the Joint Chiefs of Staff warning order for deployment to Macedonia. UN Security Council Resolution 842, passed on 14

June, called for the expansion of the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia and authorized an additional 315 soldier force from the United States.<sup>47</sup> The Berlin Brigade, earmarked for the mission, alerted the 6-502 Infantry on 15 June 1993 to begin deployment preparations. Charlie Company, a light infantry company with an authorized strength of 132 soldiers, formed the base of the battalion's task force for Macedonia. The company's major weapon systems included six dragon anti-armor systems, medium machine guns and two light mortars. The remainder of the task force included elements of the battalion headquarters for command and control, the scout and mortar platoons, and additional support personnel. Personnel remaining from A, B and the HHC formed the rear detachment.<sup>48</sup> The mission statement for the Task Force was, "On order, TF 6-502 IN (-) deploys to Skopje, former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to maintain a U.S. presence under OPCON of the United Nations on the Macedonian side of the Republic's borders with Albania, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with a mandate of monitoring and reporting any developments in the border areas that could undermine confidence and instability in Macedonia or threaten its territory."<sup>49</sup>

According to a Center for Army Lesson's Learned report, the Berlin Brigade Commander did not consider a need to change the unit's METL before deployment. The report states, "The position of U.S. Army leadership is that special training for peacekeeping operations is not required. He [Brigade Commander] believes that disciplined troops, staffs and commanders well-trained in their war fighting METL do not require special training to execute PKO [peacekeeping operations]."<sup>50</sup> Interestingly, during the contingency planning period for the operation, two months before the alert, the



Brigade's training guidance stated, "This quarter's focus must be on a new Mission Essential Task List that falls under the heading of peacekeeping, peacemaking and Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations."<sup>51</sup> The 6-502 did not change their METL after forming the task force for this peacekeeping mission.

6-502 Infantry Battalion METL	
1. <b>Execute RSOP</b>	5. <b>Attack Built Up Area</b> (task # 7-1-1037)
2. <b>Move Tactically</b> (task # 7-1-1004)	6. <b>Defend Built Up Area</b> (task # 7-1-1039)
3. <b>Perform Air Assault</b> (task # 7-1-1028)	7. <b>Establish Lodgment</b> (task # 7-1-1033)
4. <b>Attack</b> (task # 7-1-1009)	8. <b>Perform Security Operations</b>
5. <b>Defend</b> (task # 7-1-1001)	9. <b>Conduct NEO</b>
ARTEP 7-20 MTP	

Fig. 8.

The task force conducted minimal peacekeeping specific training at home station following their 15 June alert. Predeployment events included reception of new equipment and personnel, preparation for deployment, and continued garrison tasking for the TF 6-502. For example, the TF 6-502 marched in the 4<sup>th</sup> of July parade one week before deploying the main body. The training highlights to prepare the task force for the mission included drivers training, two iterations of morning sergeant's time training, and a rules of engagement class offered by the Staff Judge Advocate in the post theater.<sup>52</sup>

Task Force 6-502 closed on its base camp, near Skopje, Macedonia, in mid July 1993. Initial priorities were force protection, press relations and training for assumption

of observation posts and patrolling duties. Thirty days of peacekeeping specific training occurred under the auspices of the UNPROFOR Macedonian Command's Nordic Battalion before the TF took over their sector on the border. In-country training included patrolling in a peacekeeping environment (high visibility rather than stealth), manning an observation post, roadblock, and checkpoint (high visibility with low threat), force protection, negotiating skills, country orientation, and operational restrictions with the UN. Additionally during this period, the task force acclimatized to the area and conducted sector orientation.<sup>53</sup>




Fig. 9. U.S. Area of Operations.<sup>54</sup>

It is unclear who required the additional thirty days of in-country peacekeeping training for TF 6-502. Traditionally, American units have conducted their peacekeeping training and certification before deploying on peacekeeping mission like Able Sentry. A combination of the lack of training time available before deployment and the overestimation of the unit's training readiness for peacekeeping are possible reasons why

TF 6-502 required addition training once in Macedonia. Units following TF 6-502 were required by UNPROFOR's Macedonian Command to conduct peacekeeping training and certification at homestation before deployment.

During the first week of August, the Task Force leadership down to squad leader level, directly observed and participated in the operation of observation posts on the border. Leaders spent three days and two nights in the Swedish company's sector (the sector that TF 5-602 would assume), participating in mounted and dismounted patrols, and established temporary OPs with the Swedish soldiers. Completing peacekeeping specific training and certification in August, Task Force 6-502 established and occupied the U.S. sector. Task Force 6-502 assumed control of two permanent observation posts, built a third, and established a forward command post in sector.<sup>55</sup>

During the operation, TF 6-502 conducted little training to sustain their METL. When interviewed by observers from the Center For Army Lessons Learned, the operations officer of TF 6-502 stated that they did not have the opportunity to train any of their METL tasks while engaged in the current operations. The report reads:

The factors most limiting training of war fighting skills during this mission are the 315 soldier limit on U.S. Forces and force protection requirements. Due to the broad scope of the mission and personnel cap, this force is tailored to conduct the mission and protect itself. While doing this, there are no soldiers "left over" to train. Further, the S-3 of the unit would strongly argue that the unit's mission (and hence its METL) has changed.<sup>56</sup>

Task Force 6-502 successfully accomplished their mission, but not without significant difficulties as described in the Center for Army Lessons Learned report. According to the report, the assessment of the unit's METL during the operation was

unknown. "OPTEMPO and limited training areas did not permit testing of individual and collective proficiency. The TF commander could only estimate degradation of skills using purely subjective and personal criteria."<sup>57</sup> In January 1994, Task Force 6-502 handed over duties to TF 1-6 Infantry, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division and returned to Berlin.

### **Task Force 3-12 Infantry**

Task Force 3-12 Infantry was the fourth unit to rotate to Macedonia on Operation Able Sentry two years after the initial rotation by TF 6-502. Major differences of this rotation and that of Able Sentry I were the time available for predeployment planning and training and the type of infantry battalion tasked for the mission. The 3-12 Infantry was a mechanized battalion stationed in Baumholder, Germany when tasked for Operation Able Sentry (June to December 1995). Earmarked for the Able Sentry mission a year out, both the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division Headquarters and the 3-12 Infantry began extensive planing for the mission in January 1995. The authorized personnel strength of the battalion in January was 844 with each of the four line companies strength authorized at 107 soldiers. Major weapons systems include fifty-eight M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, six heavy mortars, dragon anti-armor weapons, and medium machine guns.<sup>58</sup> The wartime mission of the battalion was, "On order, 3-12 Infantry transition to mission and deploys within the USEUCOM AOR and conducts combat operations or military operations other than war in order to accomplish the mission (s) assigned in the deployment order."<sup>59</sup> Note in figure 12, that the task "conduct peacekeeping operations" was part of the battalion's METL at the time of notification for the Able Sentry Operations.




Figure 10.<sup>60</sup>

After conducting a mission analysis, the mission statement developed for TF 3-12 was “Task Force 3-12 (-) deploys to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia) and conducts peacekeeping operations to support UN Mandates adding stability to the FYR Macedonia.”<sup>61</sup> Like previous battalions tasked with this mission, determining the unit’s organization was a primary concern. The personnel restrictions for TF 3-12 was 552 soldiers—an increase from the 315 soldier limit established for the first and second Able Sentry rotations. Restrictions on heavy weapons included Bradley Fighting Vehicles, TOWs and 107mm mortars.<sup>62</sup> Though the basic organization for this mission was already established, organizing a mechanized infantry battalion into a peacekeeping task force presented challenges for the command. The organization of TF 3-5 CAV, the unit that TF 3-12 would replace, consisted of: two infantry companies; mortar and scout platoons; a large headquarters element for command, control and support; an aviation element of three Black Hawks and its associated maintenance

personnel; and a military intelligence section. The Commanding General, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division directed that TF 3-12 would closely follow this organization.<sup>63</sup>

The Able Sentry mission involved mostly dismounted infantry either observing from static positions or conducting foot and some mounted patrols. In a Bradley Fighting Vehicle platoon, there are only two dismounted squads, each having nine soldiers. The rest of the soldiers in the platoon fight from the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Since Bradley Fighting Vehicles did not deploy, the internal structure developed for the platoons more closely replicated that of a light infantry platoon. Though TF 3-12 Infantry only deployed three companies (A, C, and HHC), the battalion was completely reorganized. All dismounted soldiers from B and D deployed filling shortages of the deploying companies and positions in the task force. The remaining soldiers from B and D companies, along with portions of the battalion headquarters company, formed the rear detachment.<sup>64</sup>

The concept of the operations called for companies A and C, each consisting of three platoons, to occupy two company sectors along the Macedonia-Serbian border. At any given time, three platoons would be in sector with the two forward company command posts. Platoons in sector would monitor, observe, patrol and report from both permanent and temporary observation post. One company would have one platoon and the other company would have two platoons in sector. Every twenty-one days, the company boundaries would shift with the company having only one platoon in sector now having two. The company that had two platoons in sector, decreased to one platoon. The three remaining platoons from the two companies would rotate on the following missions: force protection tasks on Camp on Camp Able Sentry, quick reaction force, or

take UN leave. The remainder of the task force operated out of Camp Able Sentry with the Scouts performing local patrols around the TF headquarters and the mortar platoon guarding the UNPREDEP headquarters.<sup>65</sup>

According to the Task Force Commander, before the battalion could develop a training plan to prepare for the mission, the battalion's METL needed refinement. While the task "conduct peacekeeping operations" was on the METL, additional critical/battle tasks were identified to further focus the battalion's predeployment training. The Battalion Commander considered the METL tasks deploy/redeploy, transition to mission, perform CSS, and conduct peacekeeping operations related directly to the Able Sentry Mission. From these four METL tasks the commander identified the following battle/critical task to support the battalion's METL: conduct relief in place; sustain the force/observation points (OPs); establish a temporary checkpoint; conduct mounted patrols; establish an OP/Temporary OP; reinforce and OP/Temp OP; conduct reaction force operations; respond to the media and operate check points.<sup>66</sup>

Predeployment events included: reorganization and forming the task force; individual and collective training unique to the operations; site surveys and coordination visits with TF 3-5 CAV; personnel readiness preparation; and a final validation and certification exercise by the GOC, UNPREDEP Command.<sup>67</sup> Extensive collective training began in April 1995 with the highlighted training event being the certification exercise in Baumholder by the GOC. This exercise replicated both Camp Able Sentry and the observation posts in which the task forces would occupy. Task Force 3-12

drilled in several situational exercises on this site for two weeks and was certified by both the COG and Commanding General, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division on 21 April 1995.<sup>68</sup>

Following the validation exercise, the next two weeks consisted of final soldier readiness preparation and family support activities. The advanced party deployed on 9 May 1995, marking a two week relief in place and transition period with TF 3-5 CAV. According to the Task Force Commander, the unit was trained and ready for the mission when it arrived in Macedonia. Like previous battalions that conducted this mission, in-country training focused on mission sustainment at the platoon and squad level. Task Force 3-12 Infantry successfully conducted their peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, and returned back to Germany in December 1995.<sup>69</sup>

In review, this monograph investigated U.S. peace operations strategy, the peacekeeping environment and military doctrine, battle focused training and METL development, and three case studies involving infantry battalions preparing for and executing peacekeeping operations in the 1990's. The battalions surveyed presented three approaches in using the unit's METL to train and prepare infantry battalions for peacekeeping operations. The next chapter will analyze the logic associated with excluding peacekeeping tasks from a unit's METL.



## VI: ANALYSIS

The analysis in this chapter is in two sections. First, this chapter analyzes the logic for excluding peacekeeping specific tasks from a unit's METL. Next, this chapter assesses each battalion case study to help provide an answer to the primary research question: Should infantry battalions change their METL when preparing for and or executing peacekeeping operations? The criteria used for analysis in this section is twofold. First, each battalion's predeployment METL development process is assessed against the training doctrine established in FM 25-100. Second, this section assesses each battalion on how their METL either assisted or detracted from their versatility.

An infantry battalion commander's decision to reexamine and adjust the unit's METL after receiving orders for peacekeeping appears logical and in accordance with the METL development process. The logic in excluding peacekeeping tasks from a unit's METL, however, is questionable. One explanation for excluding peacekeeping tasks on a unit's METL is the idea that units require little or no specialized training to operate in a peacekeeping environment. Dr. Hugo Mayer in *Operations Other Than War*, a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Technical Report writes, "Training to standard on their unit's mission essential task list is sufficient to prepare soldiers for duty in OOTW."<sup>70</sup> Dr. Mayer's premise evolves from his examination of four types of OOTW activities, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In his chapter on peacekeeping Mayer asserts, "For soldiers, the nature of the tasks to be done does not change; guard duty is guard duty, maintenance is maintenance, patrolling is patrolling,

etc. The common sense, flexibility, and adaptability of the American soldier are sufficient to ensure a proper response fitting the conditions in OOTW.”<sup>71</sup>

When examining Dr. Mayer’s argument, several areas of concern surface. First, many tasks on a unit’s METL may not support the collective tasks required to accomplish a peacekeeping mission. Second, Mayer’s conclusion that task performed by soldiers in combat are essentially the same as those task performed by soldiers in a peacekeeping environment is misleading.

<b>3-110 Infantry (Mech) Battalion/Task Force METL</b>	
<b>1. Transition To Mission</b> <i>(war plan)</i>	<b>5. Attack</b> <i>(task # 7-1-3008)</i>
<b>2. Deploy/Redeploy</b> <i>(war plan)</i>	<b>6. Breach Defended Obstacle</b> <i>(task # 7-1-3027)</i>
<b>3. Perform Tactical Roadmarch</b> <i>(task # 7-1-3002)</i>	<b>7. Defend</b> <i>(task # 7-1-3009)</i>
<b>4. Fight a Meeting Engagement</b> <i>(task # 7-1-3006)</i>	<b>8. Perform CSS Operations</b> <i>(task # 7-1-3912)</i>

Fig. 11.<sup>72</sup>

In addressing the first concern with Dr. Mayer’s argument, the use of a notional mechanized infantry battalion (3-110 IN), helps show that a unit’s wartime METL does not always support peacekeeping operations. Figure 11 illustrates the METL for 3-110 IN (Mech). This METL supports the battalion’s wartime mission statement, “On order, 3-110 IN moves to and occupies an assembly area and attacks in zone to destroy enemy forces; on order, continues the attack or establishes a defense.” In developing this METL, the commander would use his mission statement, wartime plans and external

directives, and applicable mission training plan(s) to select the essential tasks for his battalion's METL.

While some of the tasks listed in figure 11 may apply to both combat and peacekeeping environments, the tasks *fight a meeting engagement* and *attack* do not. These tasks require significant modification to their conditions and standards to apply to peacekeeping. A better approach is to identify the actual tasks that apply to the peacekeeping mission. For example, each battalion surveyed in this monograph maintained a quick reaction force to reinforce patrols and observation posts. If tasked for a peacekeeping mission requiring a quick reaction force, the 3-110 Infantry commander may consider the task "assault" more appropriate for the mission than the task "attack". In instances where a task does not already exist in the unit's mission training plan, the commander can identify the task and define its associated condition and standard. The task "establish a zone of separation" is an example. By using the METL development process and identifying the actual task required for the mission, the battalion's training strategy will focus on peacekeeping if that is the unit's mission.

The purpose of a METL is to serve as the focal point for training on the collective tasks required to execute the battalion's mission. If the 3-110 IN (Mech) receives orders to conduct peacekeeping operations in the Balkans for example, both the battalion's mission and METL should change. Figure 12 on the following page represents the 3-110 Infantry's adjusted METL after assigned a peacekeeping operation. After conducting a mission analysis and restating the battalion's mission, the battalion commander would adjust his METL to focus his training effort before deployment. If the urgency of the

mission precluded time for predeployment training, the METL would still provide the battle focus for in-country training during the operation.

<b>3-110 Infantry (Mech)</b> <b>Battalion/Task Force METL</b>	
<b>1. Transition To Mission</b> <i>(war plan)</i>	<b>5. Assault</b> <i>(task # 7-1-3007)</i>
<b>2. Deploy/Redeploy</b> <i>(war plan)</i>	<b>6. Secure Ethnic Enclaves</b> <i>(local MTP)</i>
<b>3. Perform Tactical Roadmarch</b> <i>(task # 7-1-3002)</i>	<b>7. Defend</b> <i>(task # 7-1-3009)</i>
<b>4. Perform Passage of Lines</b> <i>(task # 7-1-3003)</i>	<b>8. Establish Buffer Zone/ Monitor Compliance</b> <i>(local MTP)</i>
<b>5. Secure and Clear Routes</b> <i>(local MTP)</i>	<b>8. Perform CSS Operations</b> <i>(task # 7-1-3912)</i>

Fig. 12.

Note in Figure 12, task 6, that the source listed for the task *secure ethnic enclave* reads, "local MTP." Currently, commanders lack an approved, published, and distributed mission training plan that addresses peace operations Army wide. This is not a problem if one believes that peacekeeping requires no specialized training. However, units in the field have developed their own local mission training plans to fill the void in Army level training support literature. For example, the XVIII Airborne Corps maintains several training support packages for units deploying to the Sinai.<sup>73</sup> Additionally, since the return of TF 6-502 to Berlin, the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) has developed an OOTW specific mission training plan to assist commanders in training for OOTW missions, specifically peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.<sup>74</sup> This indicates

that several army units in the field realize that peacekeeping operations do require specialized training beyond those tasks traditionally trained for combat.<sup>75</sup>

A second concern with Mayer's conclusion is his assertion that tasks performed by soldiers in combat are essentially the same as those performed in a peacekeeping environment. Mayer's claim that 'guard duty is guard duty' and 'patrolling is patrolling' in both combat and peacekeeping operations is misleading. While Dr. Mayer recognizes that certain conditions may be different, such as restrictive rules of engagement, his reliance on the adaptability of the American soldier only goes so far. What makes soldiers adaptable is performance oriented training in the expected operating conditions. A section of infantrymen occupying a checkpoint or patrolling in a peacekeeping training exercise is one example of battle focused training that helps make soldiers adaptable. A two week pre-deployment *crash course* on peacekeeping will not prepare soldiers or units for the dynamics of the peacekeeping environment.<sup>76</sup>

Dr. Mayer's argument is representative of many of the explanations offered by those who oppose combat units changing their METL once assigned a peacekeeping mission. The two major points are that peacekeeping operations do not require specialized training and the standard METL of combat units sufficiently cover the tasks required both in combat and peacekeeping operations. Army units in the field, however, are conducting specialized training and are including peacekeeping tasks on their METL.

The battalions surveyed presented three approaches in using the unit's METL to train and prepare infantry battalions for peacekeeping operations. The 3-187 Infantry, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division, changed their METL after reorganizing into a battalion task

force for the MFO peacekeeping mission. After alert for the first Able Sentry operation, the 6- 502 Infantry, Berlin Brigade, did not change their METL either before or during the mission. The 3-12 Infantry, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, did not change their METL once notified for peacekeeping operations in Macedonia.

In this section each battalion's predeployment METL development process is analyzed on how closely they followed the doctrinal guidance for METL development in FM 25-100. Next, each battalion's METL is analyzed to determine how their METL either assisted or detracted from their versatility. Versatility is the ability of tactical units to adapt to different missions and tasks, some of which may not be on a unit's METL. Infantry battalions must be able to shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently.<sup>77</sup>

The predeployment training strategy of 3-187 Infantry successfully prepared the battalion task force for their peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. The training strategy derived from a new METL specifically tailored for the MFO mission. This METL served as the base document to focus both the predeployment training effort and training for the battalion task force while deployed. Clearly 3-187 Infantry did not follow the guidance concerning METL listed in FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. Whether 3-187 Infantry followed the doctrinal guidance for METL development as described in FM 25-100 is more ambiguous. The doctrine in FM 25-100 states that the METL is based on the unit's wartime mission. This manual also states that war plans and external directives influence a unit's METL. The tasking to perform a six month operation as part of the MFO is well within this category of war plans (including contingency operations), and external

directives. A more strict interpretation of FM 100-25, however, would show that after 3-187 Infantry changed their METL they did not follow the requirement to base their METL on their wartime mission.

At the time of notification, the wartime mission statement, METL, and the organization of 3-187 Infantry, focused on combat operations. The battalion quickly developed a plan to prepare for the non-standard peacekeeping operation with the MFO. The new METL formed the basis for the battalion's predeployment training strategy. While the battalion's wartime mission and METL covered some of the tasks required of the battalion for their new mission, the battalion changed their METL to further focus the battalion's training effort for peacekeeping operations. The companies also developed new METLs to further focus their training effort. The new METL for TF 3-187 served as a useful tool to change the battalion's training and preparation focus from combat operations to peacekeeping. The 3-187 Infantry's ability to reorganize their battalion into a peacekeeping task force, train the force on a new METL, and execute their mission demonstrated the battalion's versatility.<sup>78</sup>

The predeployment training strategy of 6-502 Infantry did not adequately prepare the battalion task force for their peacekeeping mission in Macedonia. Like the 3-187 Infantry the wartime mission and METL of 6-502 Infantry focused on combat operations. The 6-502 Infantry, however, did not have the luxury of a six month notification for their peacekeeping mission as did the 3-187 and 3-12 Infantry. Tasked for the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia a month before deployment, the battalion immediately began

planning for the mission and organized into a peacekeeping task force. In this case, the battalion did not change their METL either before or during the peacekeeping operations.

The case study of 6-502 Infantry showed that this battalion followed a very strict interpretation of the definition of a METL and the guidance for METL development in FM 25-100. The 6-502 Infantry did not adequately consider the contingency plan for peacekeeping operations in Macedonia and how that plan influenced their METL. It appears that the leadership of the 6-502 initially considered that their METL covered the necessary tasks requiring training for peacekeeping operations. Once deployed and engaged in the operations, the task force operations officer indicated that, in fact, peacekeeping operations do require specialized training and suggested that their mission and METL should have change.<sup>79</sup>

The case study of 6-502 Infantry demonstrates the importance of the requirement for tactical units to remain versatile. In April 1993, the battalion began contingency planning for Operation Able Sentry. One of the challenges of focusing the battalion's training for this particular peacekeeping mission was that the battalion had additional requirements for possible employment to Bosnia with the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division. The contingency plan "Iron Promise" called for a combat assault into Sarajevo, Bosnia, in support of UN peacekeepers.<sup>80</sup> Here is a classic example of how a commander must balance the requirements of training for possible peacekeeping operations without losing the ability to go to war. It is understandable that the unit would not change their METL or training focus with the possibility of a combat operation probable. After notification



and order to prepare and deploy on Operation Able Sentry, however, adjusting the METL to support both the predeployment and in-country training may have avoided some of difficulties the unit experienced during the mission.

The identification and approval of a battalion's METL is a commander's call. It is difficult to see, however, how the METL of 6-502 Infantry assisted in the preparation for and execution of their peacekeeping mission. When examining the METL of TF 6-502, some of the tasks (with modification to the conditions and standard) may have supported their peacekeeping mission. The tasks execute RSOP, move tactically, defend, perform security operations, conduct NEO, and establish lodgment, could support the battalion's peacekeeping mission. The conditions and standards to these tasks, however, would need adjustment. The tasks attack, attack built-up area, and perform air assault seem inappropriate for the Macedonian deployment.

Though the Berlin Brigade began contingency planning for the Macedonia mission three months before deployment, minimal training on peacekeeping operations or identification of peacekeeping specific tasks occurred.<sup>81</sup> Once alerted, TF 6-502 had a month available for predeployment training, however, their training focus was not fully on the mission at hand. The Task Force continued to perform garrison tasking and experienced difficulties in identifying mission specific training tasks and peacekeeping training support materials. A more thorough mission analysis and a review of the unit's METL may have prevented some of these difficulties and added to the unit's versatility.<sup>82</sup>

The predeployment training strategy of 3-12 Infantry prepared the battalion task force for their peacekeeping mission in Macedonia. In the case of 3-12 Infantry, their

wartime mission and METL supported both traditional combat operations as well as operations other than war. Like 6-502 Infantry, 3-12 Infantry was earmarked for several variations of peace operations in the Balkans since 1993. Technically, the 3-12 Infantry did not change their METL. A detailed examination of the battalion's predeployment METL development process, however, suggest that they did change their METL. Once assigned their peacekeeping mission, the commander realized that while his METL included the task "conduct peacekeeping operations", the task did not adequately represent the many different tasks required for Able Sentry.<sup>83</sup> The commander identified the tasks transition to mission, deploy/redeploy, perform CSS operations, and conduct peacekeeping operations, as directly relating to their mission. These tasks were further refined by identifying their critical supporting tasks which formed the basis for the battalion's predeployment training plan.

The question of whether the 3-12 Infantry followed doctrine regarding METL development again depends on one's interpretation of FM 25-100. The tasks on their METL supported the battalion's wartime mission, war plans, and external directives. The battalion did consider the peacekeeping contingency plans and therefore included "conduct peacekeeping operations" on their METL. This task was too broad to provide the fidelity needed to focus unit training and required further definition after the alert for the peacekeeping mission. The tasks conduct movement to contact, attack, and breach a defended obstacle did not supported the mission. The fact that these tasks remained did not appear to detract from the battalion keeping their training focus on the mission.

The 3-12 Infantry reorganized into TF 3-12 three months before deployment. During this period, TF 3-12 conducted extensive predeployment training focused on their peacekeeping mission. The battalion's "adjusted" METL helped change the battalion's training and preparations focus from combat to peacekeeping operations. The 3-12 Infantry clearly demonstrated the true meaning of versatility. A mechanized infantry unit, trained and equipped for combat, completely reorganized itself to form a light infantry battalion task force that conducted a six month peacekeeping operation.

## VII: CONCLUSION

Peacekeeping operations, though not the primary mission of the Army, are nevertheless missions that our Army must train and prepare for to successfully execute. Peace operations are part of the national strategy to manage conflict and regional stability with the size, scope, and frequency of peace operations continuing to increase in the 1990s. Additionally, peacekeeping operations bring unique requirements to the types of operations that infantry battalions normally prepare for during training. The purpose of this study was to determine if infantry battalions should adjust their METL when preparing for and executing peacekeeping operations.

Several conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, the standard infantry battalion's wartime METL inadequately captures the mission tasks required for successfully preparing for peacekeeping operations. Of the three case studies, two battalions changed or adjusted their METL, and one battalion did not. In all cases, the battalions conducted specialized peacekeeping training, separate from their wartime METL, to prepare for their respective mission. Second, an infantry battalion's ability to analyze the peacekeeping mission and determine the right tasks for their METL adds to the unit's versatility. The battalions that changed their METL made the transition from a combat focus to peacekeeping quicker than the battalion that did not. Third, when the infantry battalion organizes into the peacekeeping task force, the battalion can no longer accomplish selected tasks to standard. The case studies suggest that the significant changes in each of the battalion's task organization dramatically change the capabilities of the unit. Fourth, once deployed, the task force can no longer train to many of the

battalion's collective tasks required to maintain proficiency on their wartime METL. Limited training time, resources, and facilities degrade several of the combat skills of units and soldiers. These conclusions all show that during each battalion's peacekeeping operation, the battalion's mission changed and therefore their METL should change to support the mission at hand—peacekeeping.

These conclusions do not suggest that every infantry battalion should put “conduct peacekeeping operations” or “separate belligerents” as tasks on their unit METL. It does suggest, however, if the battalion is earmarked or tasked for peacekeeping operations, the battalion should include peacekeeping tasks on their METL. Restricting peacekeeping tasks from a unit's METL risk sending untrained soldiers on critical missions. The battle focused training process can prepare units for both war and operations other than war such as peacekeeping. To ensure American soldiers are trained and ready for the variety of missions in which the nation calls, the METL of an infantry battalion must reflect their most likely missions. When assigned and or earmarked for peacekeeping operations, commanders should consider adjusting their METL to focus their training for peacekeeping operations.

After studying how the METL development relates to preparing infantry battalions for peacekeeping, this monograph offers two recommendations. First, delete the statement in FM 100-23 that peace operation tasks should not be listed on a unit's METL. Second, when FMs 25-100 and 101 are revised, these manuals should address the importance of operations other than war and how the METL and the METL development process can assist in training units for both war and OOTW.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Government Accounting Office (GAO), National Security and International Affairs Division, *Peace Operations - Effect Of Training, Equipment, And Other Factors On Unit Capability*, by Richard Davis, Report to Congressional Registers GAO/NSIAD-96-14, 1:0. [TRADOC Home Page]; available from <http://www-tradoc.monroe.army.mil/IRAC/gao/reports/text/ns96014.txt>; Internet; accessed 8 November 96. When reviewing this document electronically the page numbers do not correspond to the actual text. In citing this document the chapter and subsection are referenced vice page numbers.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 13-0. In Chapter 13 "Operations Other Than War," FM 100-5 recognizes thirteen OOTW activities that army forces conduct in support of national objectives. These activities include: noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and attacks and raids.

<sup>3</sup> The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Text Of A Letter From The President To The Speaker Of The House Of Representatives And The President Pro Tempore Of The Senate," 20 December 1996. [White House Virtual Library]; available from <http://library.whitehouse.gov/retriev.cgi?dbtype=7636&query=Bosnia>; Internet; accessed 22 December 1996. In this letter President Clinton writes, "In order to contribute further to a secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO has approved, and I have authorized U.S. participation in, an IFOR follow-on force to be known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR)." Additionally, U.S. forces are currently participating in Operation Guardian Assistance, a multinational effort to provide humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire established in late November 1996.

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defense (DOD), Inspector General, *Specialized Military Training For Peace Operations*, (Arlington, VA: Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, 1994), i. Joint Electronic Library, *Peace Operations* [CD-ROM], 1995. This report examines the process within the Department of Defense for identifying peace operations skills and training requirements. During this study, a team from the DOD Inspector General's Office visited 57 sites, conducted 139 interviews, and studied over 300 documents during their review. The report states, "Recent U.S. experience in peace operations has raised the question of whether well-trained, disciplined combat soldiers and the current combat planning, training, staffing, and decision making process are sufficient to ensure adequate preparation for such operations

[peace operations].” This report lists a wide range of options offered by military officials and civilian authorities on how to maintain combat readiness and ensure units and soldiers are trained for peace operations.

<sup>5</sup> DOD, 5-6. In this report the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections writes, “a significant policy debate is underway concerning the United States’ role in peace operations. Proponents on one side of the debate argue that U.S. involvement in peace operations should be severely restricted, since the primary mission of the U.S. military is to prepare to fight and win the nation’s war. Furthermore, they [Joint Chiefs of Staff] assert that the United States is neither the world’s policeman, nor are its forces structured or intended for peace operations. Advocates on the other side of the debate claim that peace operations will characterize the future, and as the sole superpower, the United States must play a significant role in them.” The DOD Inspector General found the above debate influenced personal views regarding the training of units for peace operations.

This author’s view is that the U.S. Armed Forces exists to support and defend the *Constitution of the United States*. The Armed Forces mission is to deter war and if deterrence fails, the mission of the military is to fight and win the nation’s wars on terms favorable to the nation. Deterring war involves numerous factors from maintaining a strong national economy to sustaining a battle trained and equipped force. Peace operations are part of America’s security strategy to maintain stability and manage conflict. This author agrees that peace operations will characterize the future. The military’s role in peace operations is critical in deterring war—the first half of the U.S. military’s mission. Having said this, overextending the military on peace operations, which significantly degrades combat readiness, not only jeopardizes the military’s mission of deterrence, but also the ability to fight and win the nation’s wars. A selective engagement in peace operations involving important national interests, seems to this author, the proper course.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Army, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 86.

<sup>7</sup> Though no two peacekeeping missions are alike, many are similar. The first case study, TF 3-187 in the Sinai, represents a light infantry force preparing for and executing peacekeeping operations not part of the United Nations. The MFO mission has historically involved light infantry battalion task forces rotating to the Sinai every six months. Long standing procedures and regulations dictate the size of the force, the required training, and rules of engagement. In examining the units that have rotated on this mission since 1993, a major difference between the units from the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne and 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Divisions, was deployment of the unit’s anti-armor company. Task Force 4-505, a provisional task force made up of National Guard, Reserve, and active duty volunteers, also provides a unique set of circumstances to the MFO mission, but was not examined in detail for this study.

Operation Able Sentry, on the other hand, involves mechanized infantry battalions from United States Army Europe serving on six month peacekeeping duty in Macedonia. The first rotation, however, was a light infantry task force from the Berlin Brigade. Task Force 5-602 is included in the Operation Able Sentry case study in that this rotation presents significantly different issues than the follow on rotations. Since the second rotation, the mission has stabilized and, like the MFO, standard operating procedures have been developed and many of the issues are similar between units executing the mission. Task Force 3-12 Infantry provides a representative sample of the follow on rotations (minus Task Force 2-63 Armor the current unit in Macedonia). The last two rotations involving units from the 3D Infantry Division were not examined in detail for this study.

<sup>8</sup> FM 100-23, 4.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., v.

<sup>10</sup> The White House, *A National Strategy Of Engagement And Enlargement*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1996), 22; Additional references reviewed concerning U.S. policy for multilateral peace operations include: Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy Of The United States Of America*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), 8-9; Snyder, William J. Jr., " 'Command' versus 'Operational Control': A Critical Review of PDD-25," 2-4.; available at <http://sunsite.unc.edu/jwsnyder/wisdom/pdd25.html>; Internet; accessed 9 December 1996. The 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 25, "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," is a classified document not released to the public. The NMS (8-9), refers to the criteria that the President set when negotiating American involvement in multilateral peace operations. United States officials will: seek a clear delineation of the objective of each operation; ensure that an American chain of command exists back to the President; and that appropriate rules of engagement exist to protect U.S. forces and permit the proper execution of the task. The Department of State has released an executive summary of the document which can be located on the Internet at <http://www.ccnet.com/~suntzu/pdd25.html>.

<sup>11</sup> Several pending congressional initiatives include *The Peace Powers Act of 1995* (S. 5, 1995), the *National Security Revitalization Act* (H.R. 7, 1995), and the *America Overseas Interest Act of 1995* (H.R. 1561, 1995). According to The Project on Peacekeeping and the United Nations information site, (Internet; <http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/un/unsen255.html>), the above legislation would affect U.S. fiscal policy toward the United Nations and set strict criteria for U.S. participation in multinational operations. These bills would also limit the foreign command of U.S. personnel, repeal the *War Powers Act*, and require Congressional approval before funding U.N. Operations.



<sup>12</sup> William Lewis, "A Presidential Decision Directive: Multilateral Peace Operations," 1. [Institute For National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum Home Page]; available from <http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/2302.html>; Internet; accessed 3 November 96.

<sup>13</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine For Joint Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), vii-viii, I-2.

<sup>14</sup> Department of Defense, JP 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), vii.

<sup>15</sup> FM 100-23, 12-18; JP 3-0 (V-2 to V-6) and FM 100-5 (13-3 to 13-5) also list the principles of OOTW. Field Manual 100-5 (13-3) states, "Army warfighting doctrine has long been based on well-established principles of war that have withstood the test of time and experience and remain embedded in our doctrine. Operations other than war also have principles that guide our actions. For those operations other than war that involve our forces in direct combat, the principles of war apply."

<sup>16</sup> International Peace Academy, *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985), 260. In Chapter IX, "Preparation and Preparedness," the International Peace Academy states, "Peacekeeping calls for an adjustment of attitude and approach by the soldier to a different set of circumstances from those he would normally find on the field of battle; an adjustment to suit the needs of a peaceable intervention rather than of an enforcement action."

<sup>17</sup> FM 100-23, 13, 17.

<sup>18</sup> International Peace Academy, 117.

<sup>19</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 135.

<sup>20</sup> FM 100-23, v. Commanders should also consider the OOTW principles of impartiality and restraint when developing their plan to manage conflict. The *Peacekeeper's Handbook* (272) suggest that disciplined, motivated, and courteous soldiers, remaining firm but impartial in the execution of their task, contribute to the legitimacy of the operation. While the peacekeeping force may consider itself neutral, one or both of the belligerent parties in the conflict may regard the peacekeeping force as a threat. By applying the OOTW principles of legitimacy and restraint, units may avoid relinquishing their neutrality.

FM 100-5 (13-4) defines restraint as to "apply appropriate military capability prudently." When applied to peacekeeping operations, FM 100-23 (17) states, "Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and level of violence characterize the peacekeeping environment. The use of force may adversely affect the unit's effort to gain or maintain

legitimacy as well as impede the attainment of long-term national goals.” The rules of engagement for the operation must be clear and understood by all peacekeepers. Normally in peacekeeping operations, the rules of engagement authorize the use of force only in self-defense or defense of the mandate from interference (FM 100-23, 12).

<sup>21</sup> Department of Defense, JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Peacekeeping Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), IV-4 to IV-6. The quotation in this paragraph is located on page IV-5. While doctrine and precedence show that infantry battalions are best suited for peacekeeping operations, this is not to say that other types of forces are not capable of conducting peacekeeping. The organic mobility, communications and specialized training of military police battalions for example, make them ideal for peacekeeping operations. The military acronym METT-T stands for mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time available.

<sup>22</sup> International Peace Academy, 260.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI), “Training Requirements for Stability Operations,” Winter 1995 Newsletter, 1. [ARI Home page]; available from <http://205.130.63.3/oowt.html>; Internet; accessed 15 December 1996.

<sup>24</sup> FM 100-23, 86. In the training section of this manual the authors write, “The amount of training required and when the training is given will depend on the particular peace operation mission. However, the philosophy used to determine the *how much* and *when* training questions for operations other than war can be summed up as *just enough* and *just in time*.”

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Army, FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 2-2 to 2-3.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-10, 2-2.

<sup>27</sup> Department of Defense, Inspector General, i.

<sup>28</sup> The heart of this problem (or debate) rests with FM 25-101’s (2-2) definition of METL. “The METL is an unconstrained statement of tasks required to accomplish wartime missions.” Brian D. Barham in “Cordon and Search: An Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Task For Infantry Battalions”, [(MMAS Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 15.] also finds the definition of METL in FM 25-101 restrictive. Barham suggests deleting “*wartime mission*” from the definition of METL and adding “*any mission that units are expected to perform when involved in a war or conflict*.” According to Barham, “This will allow units to keep a combat focus while preparing for operations that they anticipate being tasked to perform.”

Many officers also disagree with having peacekeeping operations on a unit's METL. Several officers in the 1996 Class of the Command and General Staff Officer Course strongly opposed having peacekeeping related tasks on the unit's METL. The sentiment for this disagreement apparently has as its basis a very strict interpretation of the term "wartime mission" and the METL development process from FM 25-101. This statement is drawn from personal observation as a student in the 1996 CGSOC class. The informal consensus of students and instructors in several training and tactics discussions was that peacekeeping tasks should not be on a unit's METL. Barham notes a similar consensus among his 1995 CGSOC classmates. In a survey submitted to 519 students, he found a general resistance to training for OOTW and having OOTW tasks on a unit's METL.

<sup>29</sup> Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps SOP To Support The MFO," Fort Bragg, North Carolina, n.d. C-2.

<sup>30</sup> Headquarters 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 187 Infantry, "MFO Rotation #29 Employment And Redeployment After Action Report (AAR)," (Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 1 March 1996), 1.

<sup>31</sup> U.S. Army, FM 101-10-1/1, *Staff Officers' Field Manual Organizational, Technical, And Logistical Data* (Volume 1), (Washington, D.C. GPO, 1987), 3-60 to 3-67, 3-151, 3-180 to 3-186.; Interview, Major William Hix, former Task Force 3-187 Executive Officer, interview by author, 19 December 1996, from author's notes, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. FM 101-10-1/1 list the organization (personnel and equipment) for a standard air assault infantry battalion. The organization of 3-187 Infantry follows the organization listed in FM 101-10-1/1 with one exception. The total authorized strength of 3-187 Infantry at the time of notification for the MFO mission was 670 soldiers vice 698 as stated in the FM. The organization of 3-187 was verified by Major Hix.

The TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided missile) is a long-range, heavy antitank system. The TOW weapon system, in the air assault infantry, is either ground or vehicle mounted.

<sup>32</sup> Interview, Major Hix. The 3-187 Infantry is one of nine air assault infantry battalions assigned to the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (Air Assault), stationed at Ft. Campbell Kentucky. According to FM 101-10-1/1, the generic mission for an air assault infantry battalions is: "To locate the enemy and destroy his fighting capability using all available means; to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by the use of all available fire and counter-attack.

<sup>33</sup> Headquarters, Task Force 3-187, "Predeployment And Redeployment After Action Report, (Sinai [South Camp], Egypt, September 1995), 1-5, C1 to C5. According to this report, "Taking only three rifle companies requires large numbers of replacements to fill the task force to 529. This diverts replacements from other units in

the division [101<sup>st</sup>] for over a month. The Division directed that this rotation would minimize replacements being fed into the MFO task force. Taking the anti-armor company reduced the requirement for replacement by over half, but there was resistance to deploying the company due to its many training requirements." Additionally, this organization facilitated the relief in place of TF 4-405 that was also organized in 4 line companies.

<sup>34</sup> Headquarters 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 187 Infantry, "Multi-National Force And Observers 3-504 Initial Coordination Inbrief," Fort Campbell, Kentucky, May 95. Briefing slides provided by Major Hix (Interview, author's notes).

<sup>35</sup> Headquarters, 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 187 Infantry, "TF 3-187 Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Predeployment Memorandum of Instruction (MOI)," (Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 20 March 1995), B-1-1.

<sup>36</sup> TF 3-187 MFO Predeployment MOI, B-1-1 to B-5-1

<sup>37</sup> MFO 3-504 Initial Coordination Inbrief.

<sup>38</sup> Predeployment AAR, 1-3. According to MAJ Hix (Interview, author's notes), in addition to the predeployment training, the task force split their property books with the rear detachment, conducted preparation for overseas movement, and authorized two weeks of block leave for deploying soldiers.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. 3, C-1.

<sup>40</sup> MFO Rotation #29 Redeployment AAR, 2,14. Task Force 3-504, the TF that relieved TF 3-187, however, chose to use the three line company organization with two companies rotation in the northern sector, and one company rotation platoons internally in the southern sector.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. 6, C-3-17.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., C-5-1 to C-5-5..

<sup>43</sup> Interview Major Hix. METL assessment is from copies of 3-187 Infantry's Quarterly Training Brief to the Commanding General upon their return from the Sinai.

<sup>44</sup> U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Lessons Learned Report: Operation Able Sentry*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: GPO, October 1994), iii.; Casandra Brewster, "Mission In Macedonia," *Soldiers*, October 1993, 6.

<sup>45</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Carter Ham, interview by Kim R. Daniel, 18 August 1995. [CALL Electronic File Room, Able Sentry]; Internet; accessed 9 December 1996.

<sup>46</sup> The Institute of Public Policy, 49-51.; TRADOC, CALL, "Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) In The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia," in *News From The Front!*, by Bill Huggins, May 1994, 6.

<sup>47</sup> CALL, *Lessons Learned Report: Operation Able Sentry*, iii.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 12, 21.

<sup>49</sup> TRADOC, CALL, "Preventive Diplomacy In The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia", in *News From The Front!*, by Bill Huggins, April 1994, 1.

<sup>50</sup> CALL, *Lessons Learned Report: Operation Able Sentry*, 12.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* 12-13.

<sup>53</sup> TRADOC, CALL, "The Heavy Infantry Battalion In Peace Operations," in *New From The Front!*, by Jim Walley, May 1994, 3.; CALL, *Lessons Learned Report: Operations Able Sentry*, 19.

<sup>54</sup> Map sketched from FM 100-23, 3.

<sup>55</sup> CALL, *Lessons Learned Report: Operation Able Sentry*, 19.; CALL, "Preventive Diplomacy," 2-3.

<sup>56</sup> CALL, *Lessons Learned Report: Operations Able Sentry*, 21.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> FM 101-10-1/1, 1-44 to 1-49, 1-149; Lieutenant Colonel Kamena, Commander 3-12 Infantry [former Commander TF 3-12], interview by author, 21 December, 1996, author's notes, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This interview was conducted by electronic mail with LTC Kamena in Baumholder, Germany. This author sent a series of questions to LTC Kamena regarding TF 3-12's participating in Able Sentry. LTC Kamena provided a written response to the questions and also provided this author with portion of TF 3-12's Able Sentry After Action Report. One follow-up interview was conducted on 1 January 1996 by electronic mail.

<sup>59</sup> Headquarters 2d Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, "2d Quarter FY 95 Command Training Guidance," (Baumholder, Germany, 14 January 1995), 1; Interview LTC Kamena, author's notes. According to FM 101-10-1/1 (1-45), the generic mission of a

mechanized infantry battalion task force is "to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close, combat, and counter attack." Task Force 3-5 CAV, a sister infantry battalion from 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, was the unit conducting Operation Able Sentry before 3-12 Infantry. The Division Headquarters in January, was both supporting the ongoing Able Sentry mission and planning for the relief in place by TF 3-12.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., enclosure 2. The 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division directed common METLs for all infantry and armor battalions in January 1995. This was to standardize unit training and focus training for possible contingency operations in Bosnia and Macedonia.

<sup>61</sup> Interview LTC Kamena, author's notes.

<sup>62</sup> Interview LTC Ham, CALL, 2.

<sup>63</sup> Interview LTC Kamena, author's notes. During the second in-progress review for this operations to the Commanding General, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, General Carter was very specific in that the task organization of TF 3-12 should mirror that of TF 3-5.

<sup>64</sup> Interview LTC Kamena, author's notes.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Headquarters 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, "3D Quarter FY 95 Command Training Guidance," (Baumholder, Germany, 24 April 1995), 2, 11.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Interview LTC Kamena, author's notes.

<sup>70</sup> TRADOC, TRADOC Analysis Center, Technical Report: *Operations Other Than War*, by Hugo. E. Mayer, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: GPO, 1995), 7-1.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 4-2.

<sup>72</sup> U.S. Army, ARTEP 71-2-MTP, *Mission Training Plan For The Tank And Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force*, (Washington, D.C. GPO, 1988), 2-3 to 2-5.

<sup>73</sup> Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, "XVIII Airborne Corps SOP To The MFO," Fort Bragg, North Carolina, n.d.; Force Headquarters, Multinational Force and Observers, "Pre-Deployment Training Management Plan," El Gorah (North Camp), Egypt, n.d. These documents assist commanders in determining their mission essential

tasks for the Sinai mission and their predeployment training plan. In addition to these manuals, the Multinational Force and Observers Force Headquarters, working through the XVIII Airborne Corps, publishes the "Infantry Battalion Pre-Deployment Training Package" that addresses infantry specific training requirements and tasks to be conducted before deployment.

<sup>74</sup> Headquarters, Seventh Army Training Command, "White Paper: Platoon, Company/Team, Battalion/Task Force Mission Training Plan For Stability Operations," Hohenfelds, Germany, June 1995.

<sup>75</sup> GAO, (Chapter 2:3:1:1); CALL, xiii-xiv. The Army as a whole is well on its way to closing the gap in peacekeeping training support literature. As of 1995, a completed final draft of TC-98-1 *Brigade and Battalion Operations Other Than War Training Support Package* was circulated to the field for final comments. The 7<sup>th</sup> Army Training Command also incorporated stability operations into most unit rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center since 1993. These initiatives, focused on peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, greatly assisted in preparing thousands of soldiers for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.

<sup>76</sup> Units assigned peacekeeping operations are routinely given three to five months to task organized, train, and prepare for their scheduled mission. The case studies demonstrate that both the 3-187 Infantry and the 3-12 Infantry both began formal planning for their operations six months out from deployment. Mission specific training began approximately three months before deployment for both units. This indicates that the leadership of these organizations recognized the requirement to conduct specialized training for their units separate from the normal training for combat operations. Both of these units were prepared to assume their mission once deployed to their respective area of operations.

The 6-502 Infantry did not conduct extensive mission specific training prior to deployment. Instead, this unit took the "crash course" training approach. The lack of training time available before deployment or the command's philosophy that their peacekeeping mission in Macedonia required no special training are possible explanations for the command's training strategy. Once deployed, however, the 6-502 was not ready to assume their mission. The task force first completed a month of peacekeeping training in Macedonia before assuming their sector.

<sup>77</sup> FM 100-5, 2-9.

<sup>78</sup> One could argue that the 3-187, after completely reorganizing their battalion, changing their METL, and training exclusively for their upcoming peacekeeping mission, lost their versatility. This demonstrates that there is a limit to this tenet. This is especially true for units required to perform peacekeeping operations under the current accepted rules and doctrine for these types of operations.

<sup>79</sup> CALL, *Lessons Learned Report: Operations Able Sentry*, 21. Besides not providing the training focus for the task force before deployment, the METL of TF 6-502 did not assist in focusing the battalion's in-country training effort. The unchanged battalion's METL was a source of frustration for the task force operations officer. He stated that TF 6-502 could not train on their METL tasks during the mission for several reasons. The organization had significantly changed, the mission took priority, and the peacekeeping environment in Macedonia precluded aggressive training that might alarm the local populace. The Operations Officer argued that both their mission and METL should have changed.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>81</sup> In the CALL lesson learned report (12), C/6-502 did complete some training during this period to include one week of peacekeeping training at the Berlin MOUT site and two interrogations of sergeant's time PKO training. Some tasks were extracted from military police manuals and concepts learned at CMTC when the unit opposed the Dutch Marines conducting a peace enforcement exercise.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>83</sup> Interview LTC Kamena, author's notes.



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